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The Roots of Authoritarianism in
Turkish Neoliberalism
Turkey has long been a source of interest for those who study the
development of the modern state and capitalism in the non-Western
world. The processes of capitalist incorporation and the modern state
formation brought the end of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of
nation states such as the Republic of Turkey in the Middle East. This great
metamorphosis of the early twentieth century sparked the attention of
many prominent intellectuals from different ends of the political spectrum,
including Marxists like Trotsky and Luxemburg
almost a century ago during the revolutionary period of change between
1900s–1930s. Since 2002, a similar process of transformation is taking
place in Turkey with the rise of the AKP (the Justice and Development
Party). Once more Turkey’s change is attracting much attention and is
perplexing us as it unfolds with ensuing chapters of power struggles.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the AKP, was initially welcomed as a
progressive Islamist who could ‘prove’ to the world that Islam, capitalism,
liberalism, and democratic values can coexist and thrive. Those who were
critical of or disillusioned by the previous westernizing, modernizing,
corporatist, and secular power block, the Kemalists, welcomed the AKP as
a progressive social force as it mobilized the masses who were
disenfranchised by the previous regime or contested its pattern of
modernization. His movement was the first Islamic movement in the
region to openly embrace capitalism and advocate liberal values. When the
AKP entered the political arena, the only viable electoral alternative was a
relatively more statist and protectionist Kemalism, which was less
desirable for global capital compared to Erdoğan’s movement. Erdoğan
found national and international fame swiftly as he claimed his first
electoral victory in 2002. The AKP was promoted as a role model for
struggling regimes of the Middle East. His power grew exponentially and
uninterruptedly after that initial victory. He has outlasted his rivals
through several political challenges including a court case to close down
his party in 2008, the Arab Spring-like Gezi revolt, an alleged corruption
scandal in 2013, and a failed coup attempt which took place during the
time of the writing of this review in 2016.
Today, Erdoğan and his movement evoke as much fascination as fear. It
has concentrated unprecedented power, eroded rule of law, engaged in
international crises, promoted unsustainable and environmentally
destructive growth driven by construction, Islamized public space, and
undermined an already problematic secularism in Turkey. But how did a
political party that evoked so much hope for progress and democratization
in 2002 run aground in the most terrible ways? Its Syrian policy
bankrupted, it became practically and legally authoritarian and now it’s in
the process of creating a one-party state and amending the constitution for
a ‘Turkish-style’ presidency. How did so many people fail to see this
refutation of democracy? What did the left say during his ascension to
power? What did the liberals and the conservatives say? How could the EU
or the Obama administration remain pro-AKP for so long? Did the AKP
and/or Erdoğan change at one point or did he always have such an
agenda? Whether or not Erdoğan’s movement always had an authoritarian,
Muslim nationalist feature that only surfaced with subsequent challenges
is still at the heart of debates surrounding the AKP. Cihan Tuğal’s new
book, The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought
Down Islamic Liberalism,is a welcome and refreshing look into those
questions. His study is very user-friendly for a readership that is not
directly familiar with Turkey or the Middle East. It focuses on the political
economic aspects of this story through a Gramscian lens.
Cihan Tuğal works on Islamic mobilization in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran. His
research focuses on socioeconomic change, mobilization, and the role of
religion in sociopolitical projects. His 2009 book Passive Revolution:
Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism was a pioneering study on
the rise of the AKP and the transformation of Islamist ideology in general.
In this book, Tuğal argues that the Islamists of Turkey absorbed and
internalized the discourses of their ideological enemies in a process of
passive revolution. This passive revolution helped them become the new
historic bloc
without a violent revolution. The political structures and the ‘rules of the
game’ are transformed without strong social processes. This argument is
used to explain how the AKP, unlike many other Islamists in the Middle
East, accepted a form of capitalism and democracy that eventually brought
it major success.
The AKP’s economic liberalization coupled with its rhetorical dedication to
political liberalism turned Erdoğan’s party and style into a ‘role model’ for
successful liberalization of the Middle East and ‘rendering Islam
governable.’
Tuğal defines this ‘Turkish model’ as an:
Islamic Americanism with a revolutionary rhetoric, backed by liberals
and some leftists in its half-hearted fight against the remnants of
authoritarian secularism. Islamic neoliberalism in Turkey brought
about an uneven (but still real) cultural, political, and economic
inclusion of disadvantaged strata into established institutions without
the need for revolutionary mobilization. Turkish Islamists had found a
formula that could absorb the shock of the Iranian revolution.
The formula proved popular at home and abroad, and this popularity
glossed over the internal contradictions of its logic and its
authoritarianism, according to Tuğal, until the Gezi revolt in June 2013.
From then onward the contradictions of Islamic liberalism—its
authoritarian tendencies, its intra-elite struggles and its reckless neoliberal
drive of growth—became obvious discontents. It felt like the AKP lost some
sort of a rhetorical immunity from criticism that it enjoyed whilst the
facades of ‘democratization’ and ‘growth’ were sustained. Tuğal does not
delve into this in depth, but this demise was also a consequence of the
AKP’s crumbling foreign policy that increasingly isolated Erdoğan.
Many scholarly studies broadly agree on these basic facts concerning the
fate of the AKP. The big debate emerges from the questions ‘why and when’
the demise began. Tuğal’s genuine contributions start precisely with the
‘end’ of the hopes for Islamic liberalism, as he puts it, and his answer to the
question ‘why.’ He looks at political economy instead of civil society or
cultural explanations, and he consequently sees authoritarianism from the
very beginning of the AKP, unlike others who often see authoritarianism
emerging during different times of the AKP’s tenure. He argues that AKP’s
Islamist passive revolution, which absorbed the bottom-up energies of
Islamism in Turkey ‘generated by 1968, the Iranian revolution of 1979 and
the challenge of radical Islam,’
was doomed to fail and he asks if this tells us anything new about the
nature of passive revolutions as such.
The AKP’s model is doomed to fail, according to Tuğal, not because of its
leader’s much criticized persona or the sociological background of the
movement’s constituency, but because of ‘the neoliberal-liberal democratic
model’ that it pursued.
This is an interesting argument since that very model was what promoted
‘AKP cheerleading’, as Tuğal occasionally puts it, by the actors that
pursued a new hegemonic order in the Middle East. In the first half of his
book, Tuğal spends much of his energy, very productively, convincing the
reader about why the AKP’s authoritarianism and its model’s flaws were
overlooked by the global actors until 2013. He argues that the flaws were
there since the beginning but they were ignored. The AKP’s demise is
linked to the crisis of world capitalism’s hegemonic order lead by the US.
During the Arab uprisings, or the Arab Spring, which preceded the Gezi
revolt, the AKP’s internal contradictions still had not surfaced, and it
appeared to many commentators and decision makers that the AKP’s
‘Turkish model’ could be exported to countries like Tunisia, Egypt, or Iran.
That was indeed a very fascinating yet short interval of time. Tuğal engages
with a comparative analysis of these countries’ moments of transformation
after the Arab Spring and argues that despite their potential for economic
liberalization, the Turkish model or an Islamic passive revolution, could
not have been adopted in these countries primarily because the Turkish
model was uniquely conditional to Turkey. His comparisons (chapters 3 to
5) serve to make this point stronger by distinguishing particular
differences between these three countries’ liberalization processes as
opposed to Turkey where a combination of factors made the rise of the
AKP possible. Tuğal’s insightful summaries of Egyptian, Iranian, and
Tunisian attempts of transformation provide new perspectives for scholars
interested in these countries.
One could naturally ask how the AKP could sustain the level of popularity
it has had and gain electoral victories with the kind of authoritarianism
and neoliberal economic agenda that Tuğal accurately argues are damaging
to the very classes of people who support the movement. This question has
been puzzling those who study contemporary Turkey, and it’s the same
question that puzzled Gramsci while he was writing the Prison Notebooks.
Tuğal’s book does not deal with this question head-on (unlike his previous
book Passive Revolution), but it occasionally bumps into it as he describes
the AKP as a ‘good consent builder’ and a benefactor of certain segments of
society. However, the political economy framework falls short of analyzing
how the AKP could have been such a good consent builder at home for so
many years given its poor human development index performance.
The AKP’s antagonistic but successful mobilization of its own constituency
needs as much attention as its ability to convince global actors.
Whatever reputation the Turkish model had in May 2013 was gone by the
end of the summer of the same year. The Gezi Park protests of May, which
started initially as an environmentalist reaction to the AKP’s destructive
construction driven growth, turned into the Gezi revolt by the end of
August 2013. The protests soon attracted large segments of people who
were unhappy with various aspects of the AKP’s rule since 2002.
Thousands took to the streets in the urban centers across Turkey, and a
brief commune was established in Taksim square, the ground zero of the
protests. Leftists, nationalists, Kurdish activists, LGBT groups, feminists,
and many others, sometimes with conflicting political agendas, united
under their opposition to neoliberalism, the AKP, political Islam, and a
broad call for pluralism. Erdoğan’s disastrous and violent handling of the
situation exposed the inner contradictions and limits of the AKP’s model
both at home and abroad.
The Turkish Islamists’ most powerful political tool, consent building
through a pro-democratic and pro-capitalist discourse, bankrupted as Gezi
Park protesters were crushed by disproportionate state violence for
months. Tuğal’s book presents a very good analysis of why and how a
particular group, the urban middle classes, came to be the first group to
show collective discontent against the AKP’s policies during the Gezi revolt
of 2013. It is a valuable addition to the field of study given the scholarly
confusion the Gezi revolt created as to its nature and constituency. In this
book, Tuğal builds on his previous writing
on the topic, expands it and accurately defines the Gezi movement as a
predominantly middle class one that is essentially anti-commodification.
The Gezi revolt becomes a litmus paper or truth test for the AKP’s
rhetorical dedication to democracy and pluralism. Thus, it also shows the
world the limits of a neoliberal economic model, just like other
contemporary protests in places like the United States, Greece, Egypt,
Spain, Israel, or Brazil. Tuğal speculates that if Gezi, the end of the Turkish
model as he describes it, could be the beginning of a new leftist trajectory
in politics.
The feeling that one gets at the end of this book is that the AKP’s earlier
‘days of promise’ were contingent upon the hegemonic hopes of the global
north to create a new lebensraum for capital in the region. The AKP’s
performance appeared like a success while simultaneously causing
asymmetric development and discontent, winners and losers, only to
release these internal tensions once it was ‘stretched’ too much during the
attempt to export the Turkish model. It makes one wonder how this
particular Islamic passive revolution figures as compared to other
examples in history such as the Meiji restoration, the Italian Risorgimento,
or the Mexican Revolution. Tuğal provokes us to think in new ways and
offers some insightful paths to follow for researchers of contemporary
Turkey and neoliberalism. His book is a fresh read in the abundance of
books on the AKP and the Arab Uprisings. This is primarily due to his
focus on political economy and (neo)Gramscian approach instead of the
often-preferred theories on culture and identity.
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